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EXCLUSIONARY ZONING-Does A Zoning
Ordinance With Racially Discriminatory Effects
Violate the Constitution? Metropolitan Housing
Development Corporationv. The Village of Arlington
Heights.
The seemingly unlimited power of a local government to determine land use within its borders has collided with the gradually
expanding limits of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The results of Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation v. The Village of Arlington Heights' indicate that a
municipality indeed is limited in its zoning power whenever the
effects of its land use policies promote segregation or, more specifically, inhibits integration.'
This comment will discuss the Arlington Heights case, and then
concentrate upon three aspects of the decision. The effects analysis
used by the Arlington court will be examined and compared to the
alternate approach of motive inference. The constitutional reasoning used in similar cases will next be discussed, including not only
the equal protection basis of the Arlington Heights decision but also
the Fair Housing Act rationale of the court in United States v. City
of Blackjack, Missouri.3 Finally, the compelling justification requirement imposed by the Arlington Heights court will be analyzed
and the advisability of imposing a less stringent test will be examined.
LINCOLN GREEN

The Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation
(M.H.D.C.), is a non-profit corporation organized to develop low
and moderate income housing in the Chicago metropolitan area. It
has been involved in the development of scores of apartments and
houses under federally subsidized programs. In 1970 M.H.D.C. was
selected by the Clerics of St. Viator, a Catholic religious order, to
develop part of an eighty acre tract owned by the clerics. The sales
agreement provided that the development be built for low and moderate income persons chosen in accordance with the provisions of
1. 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975).
2. Cases of this type are generally referred to as "exclusionary zoning," that is, the use of
the zoning power by a municipality to maintain itself as an enclave of affluence or of social
homogeneity. See, e.g., Brooks, Exclusionary Zoning, 3 AM. Soc'Y oF PLANNING OFFICIALS
(1970).
3. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 7

section 236 of the National Housing and Urban Development Act
of 1968.1
The development, called Lincoln Green, was to occupy 15 acres
and to consist of 190 single family attached homes, commonly called
townhomesA The property is located in and subject to the zoning
ordinances of Arlington Heights, Illinois, a village situated in the
northwest suburbs of Chicago. The Viatorian land, as well as all of
the surrounding property, is zoned R-3, a designation primarily limited to single family residences with exceptions for churches and
schools.6 Lincoln Green would be bordered by the remaining Viatorian land on two sides, including a Catholic high school. The other
two sides of the development would be across the street from single
family homes.
Arlington Heights, having no special zoning category for townhomes, requires a multifamily designation, R-5,7 for such developments. M.H.D.C. applied for a zoning variance on the property.
Reports of the Fire Chief, the Building Commissioner, the Director
of Public Works and the Acting Director of Engineering mentioned
only one problem with the proposed development, that of water runoff. In order to alleviate that problem, M.H.D.C. incorporated suggested changes into its plans for the proposed development.
M.H.D.C. also presented studies showing that no major traffic problems would result from Lincoln Green and that the project would
make a net tax contribution to the Village.
4. Section 236 of the National Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 12 U.S.C. §
1715z-1. Section 236 is a program, administered through the Federal Housing Administration,
to aid in the construction of rental units for low and moderate income persons. To qualify
for subsidies the developer must rent to tenants who meet certain eligibility requirements in
regard to their income and family size. The subsidies are passed to the tenants in the form
of reduced rents.
5. The development was planned to include 100 one-bedroom units (primarily for elderly
residents), 48 two-bedroom units, 30 three-bedroom units, and 12 four-bedroom units. The
buildings would be two stories or less and occupy less than twelve percent of the property.
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 12, Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. The Village
of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975).
6. Under the Zoning Ordinance of the Village of Arlington Heights this property can be
developed for single-family detached dwellings at a density of 8750 square feet of lot per
dwelling, yielding between fifty to sixty units on the subject property. Id. at 11.
7. Two members of the Arlington Heights Plan Commisssion noted:
In the Village Code, there is no separate classification for townhouse development.
Therefore, it of necessity accepts the classification of R-5. The proposal in no way
approaches the density, architecture, or other characteristics of R-5. Professional
planners designate townhouse construction of this nature akin to R-3 rather than
R-5. The Lincoln Green proposal suffers from the lack of a separate classification
in our ordinance.
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants Exhibit 43, Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. The
Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975).
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After public hearings, the Plan Commission recommended
against the rezoning. On September 28, 1971 the Board of Trustees
of the Village voted six to one to deny the requested variance. The
major justification for the refusal was that the Village's Comprehensive Plan, adopted in 1959, allowed R-5 zoning only as a buffer
between single family homes and commercial, industrial or other
high intensity use.
Suit was instituted in U.S. district court' by M.H.D.C. and individual plaintiffs' against the Village of Arlington Heights, seeking
a declaratory judgment invalidating the Arlington Heights zoning
ordinance as applied to the subject property. Also sought was an
injunction restraining defendants, including the individual Trustees
of the Village, from "preventing or interfering with the development
of the housing project."' 0 The district court found that the Village
was acting to protect property values and to adhere to its Comprehensive Plan. Since these were considered legitimate objectives, and
not arbitrary action violative of the fourteenth amendment, the
court found for the defendants."
THE ARLINGTON DECISION

An appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit followed," in which petitioners argued several alternate
theories.
The first theory was that the Village's zoning policies were administered in an arbitrary manner, so that M.H.D.C. was discriminated
against in the manner prohibited in Yick Wo v. Hopkins." The court
found that although the Comprehensive Plan was not strictly adhered to, there was some consistency in the Board's policies. The
court noted that the Board had allowed 60 zoning changes, of which
only four constituted clear violations of the buffer zone policy; two
permitted variances possibly constituted violations, and other vari8. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. The Village of Arlington Heights, 373
F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
9. Individual plaintiffs Isaac Greenwood, Willie Ransom and Arthur Gutherie work in the
Arlington Heights area but reside in segregated areas of either Chicago or Evanston, Illinois.
Intervening plaintiff Eluteria D. Maldonado resides and works in Arlington Heights. Brief for
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3, Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. The Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975).
10. 373 F. Supp. at 209.
11. Id.at 212.
12. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. The Village of Arlington Heights, 517
F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975).
13. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). The case involved a San Francisco ordinance prohibiting the
existence of launderies anywhere other than in brick or stone buildings. The facts indicated
that Chinese aliens were the primary victims of the ordinance. The Court found application
of the ordinance racially motivated and struck it down on equal protection grounds.
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ances were rejected due to the buffer zone policy. Since Arlington
Heights had demonstrated a concern for preserving the integrity of
its plan, its refusal to rezone the Viatorian land was not impermissibly discriminatory. 4
M.H.D.C. next propounded a theory based on racial discrimination, reasoning that since forty percent of the prospective residents
of Lincoln Green would be black, in conformance with the requirements of section 236, a higher percentage of blacks than whites
would be affected, rendering the Board's decision racially discriminatory. The United States Supreme Court had, however, in James
v. Valtierra6 explicitly rejected a similar contention. There, the
Court was concerned with a provision in the California Constitution
which required approval by referendum of all state developed lowrent housing. The Court stated:
The Article requires referendum approval for any low-rent public
housing project, not only for projects which will be occupied by a
racial minority. And the record here would not support any claim
that a law seemingly neutral on its face is in fact aimed at a racial
minority. '1
Even though a greater percentage of blacks than whites would be
affected by requiring a referendum on such low income housing, the
Court found no impermissible racial classification implicit in the
referendum requirement.'" Following this reasoning, the Arlington
Heights court found that racial disparity alone, when applied to
housing, is not tantamount to impermissible discrimination. 8
The court did, however, accept the premise that the resulting
racial disparity would have an ultimately racially discriminatory
effect which itself violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 9 Such reasoning apparently distinguishes between an action affecting a racial minority disproportionately and
an action having a discriminatory effect.
The court then required compelling justification from Arlington
Heights for its refusal to rezone. The justifications advanced by the
Village were determined not to be sufficiently compelling. The judgment of the district court was reversed and remanded. 0
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

517 F.2d at 412
402 U.S. 137 (1971).
Id.at 141.
Id.
517 F.2d at 413.
Id.at 415.
Id.
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MOTIVES V. EFFECTS

Although the Arlington Heights court refrains from discussion of
the motives of the Village, evidence was introduced at trial by
M.H.D.C. to demonstrate a racial motive. This evidence included
petitions, signed by residents of Arlington Heights, protesting development of Lincoln Green,' letters by residents to a local newspaper
stating opposition to the project in racial terms,2 2 and accounts of
public meetings describing large overflow crowds with participants
making speeches about residents' feared influx of blacks.2 3 The Village President was quoted as saying that, ". . . the objections of the
residents is (sic) a mandate to reject this proposal. 24 A convincing
argument could be made that the furor and emotion resulting from
Lincoln Green could only be generated by racial motives on the part
of Arlington Heights' residents and that this display of racial hostility influenced the Village Board.
In a similar case, Dailey v. City of Lawton, Oklahoma,25 an attempt was made to build, in a white area, a housing project primarily for black, Spanish-American, and poor white residents. Evidence
of racially motivated petitions and telephone calls was introduced,
and a dissenting member of the Planning Commission testified that
the opposition to the project was racially motivated. 21 The court
stated that:
if proof of a civil right violation depends on an open statement by
an official of an intent to discriminate, the Fourteenth Amendment offers little solace to those seeking its protection. In our opinion it is enough for the complaining parties to show that the local
officials are effectuating the discriminatory designs of private
individuals.Y
The actions of the City of Lawton were found to be racially motivated and arbitrary, in violation of the fourteenth amendment.2
The Arlington Heights case can be distinguished from Lawton in
that the area surrounding the land for the Lawton housing project
was zoned high density residential, 2 and that present and former
directors of the Lawton Planning Commission felt there was no
21. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants Exhibits 17, 42, 37 and 38, Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp. v. The Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975).
22. Id., Exhibit 48.
23. Id. at 28.
24. Id., Exhibit 42.
25. 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
26. Id. at 1039.
27. Id.
28. Id.at 1040.
29. Id.at 1038.
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reason not to rezone the land. Similar evidence in the Arlington
Heights case might have provided a sufficient basis for that court
to infer a racial motive. Even under such circumstances, a decision
grounded on ascertainable effects is a more rational approach than
speculation into motivation.
Although not discussing motives, certain language in the
Arlington Heights opinion intimates that a malevolent motive was
present. The court took judicial notice ".

.

. that there exists in

Chicago and its environs a high degree of racial residential segregation." '3' The four-township northwest Cook County area which in-

cludes Arlington Heights, had, in the years 1960 to 1970, a population increase of 219,000 people, of which only 170 were black. While
the percentage of blacks in this area actually decreased over this
period, the black population in the entire Chicago metropolitan area
increased from fourteen percent in 1960 to eighteen percent in
1970.32 The court utilized such statistics to conclude that the Village
"exploited" the segregation problem to become an almost one
hundred percent white community.3 While such a comment may be
interpreted to refer to the Village's motivation in keeping the allwhite status quo, such statistics are more appropriate in discussing
the "historical context" aspect of effect.
Courts are increasingly investigating the effects of laws, ordinances, and administrative decisions, both in the public and private
sectors, while ignoring the motives or intent of those decisionmakers. The United States Supreme Court, in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. ,3 held that good intent does not redeem employment practices
which tend to freeze the status quo of prior discriminatory practices.
Congress directed the thrust of the Civil Rights Act of 196435 to the
consequences of these employment practices, and not merely to the
motivation behind utilizing them.3" The court in Williams v.
Mathews, 37 a case involving a real estate transaction, stated:
The courts will look beyond the form of a transaction to its substance and proscribe practices which actually predictively result in
30. Id. at 1040.
31. 517 F.2d at 413.
32. Although the population of Arlington Heights in 1970 was 64,884 only 27 of its residents were black. According to statistics of plaintiffs' expert demographer and urbanologist,
Pierre de Vise, Professor, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, Arlington Heights is the
most residentially segregated community in the Chicago metropolitan area among municipalities with more than fifty thousand residents. Id. at 414.

33. Id.
34.
35.
36.
37.

401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974).
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racial discrimination irrespective of defendant's motivation."
Another eighth circuit case following this reasoning is United
States v. City of Blackjack, Missouri, 3 a case which is similar to the
facts of the Arlington Heights case, and which also used an effects
analysis. In City of Blackjack, residents voiced opposition to a low
to moderate income housing project, Park View Heights, which was
similar to the development in Arlington Heights.'" An important
distinguishing fact, however, was that the City of Blackjack, after
learning of the project took positive action to incorporate the land
upon which the development was to be built, and zone it in a way
to preclude construction." The court stated that an improper motive could be established circumstantially, and inferred that race
was the significant factor in both of these actions. However, the
court did not base its decision on an illegal purpose, and stated:
Effect, and not motivation, is the touchstone, in part because
clever men may easily conceal their motivations, but more importantly because, . . . whatever our law once was. . . we now firmly
recognize that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as
disastrous and unfair to private rights and the public interest as
the perversity of a willful scheme."2
Cases such as Dailey, which infer motive from circumstantial
evidence, appear to be on the decline. Courts now seem to be shifting their focus away from motivation and to an analysis of effect.
The Supreme Court preferred this approach in Wright v. Council of
City of Emporia.'3 In Emporia, the district court found the purpose
of new school districting to be discriminatory; it did not, however,
rest its holding on motivation, but rather on the effect of the action." The Supreme Court held this approach to be proper. 5
The racially discriminatory effect of the decision not to rezone by
the Arlington Heights Board was found to be "in all probability,
that no section 236 housing will be built in Arlington Heights since
plaintiffs were unable to find an ecomonically feasible and suitable
38. Id. at 826.
39. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
40. Id. at 1185. Leaders of the incorporation movement, individuals circulating petitions,
and even zoning commissioners all expressed opposition to Park View Heights in racial terms.
Speakers received cheers at public meetings debating incorporation when racial remarks
accompaied their criticism of the project.
41. Id. at 1183.
42. Id. at 1185.
43. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
44. Wright v. County School Board of Greensville Co., 309 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Va. 1970),
aff'd sub nom. Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
45. 407 U.S. at 462.

148
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alternate site. .. .", Although this project would have minimal
effects in alleviating the segregation problem in the entire metropolitan Chicago area, it would have an impact in Arlington Heights by
increasing its minority population one thousand percent.
Of more crucial importance to the court was the fact that although the Village was not responsible for the segregated housing
patterns in the entire Chicago area, it could not ignore the problem.' 7 The Seventh Circuit, in an earlier opinion, had found that a
defendant could not use his innocence in creating a discriminatory
situation as a defense to charges that he utilized the problem for his
own advantage. Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc.,'" held that a
builder could not exploit the inflated market prices that existed
because of the segregated housing situation in Chicago, even though
he was in no way responsible for creating the discrimination that led
to the problem.' 9 Arlington Heights had never sponsored nor participated in any low-income housing development. The easing of the de
facto segregation problem is contingent upon allowing the construction of such developments. 50 For these reasons the Arlington Heights
court held
the rejection of Lincoln Green has the effect of perpetuating both
this residential segregation and Arlington Heights' failure to accept any responsibility for helping to solve this problem. 5
In United Farmworkers of Florida Housing Project, Inc. v. City
2
of Delray Beach, Florida,1
similar grounds were found sufficient to
constitute a discriminatory effect. The ultimate effect of Delray's
past and present conduct in administering its housing policies
would be the confinement of low income housing construction to the
segregated area of the city. Since racial minority citizens in disproportionate numbers live in low income housing, segregation would
be reinforced.53 The court found these consequences particularly
46. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. The Village of Arlington Heights, 517
F.2d at 414. Conflicting evidence was presented as to whether there were other suitable sites
where Lincoln Green could have been constructed. Chief Judge Fairchild agreed with the
majority opinion's reasoning but dissented on this point.
A review of the record reveals that, at the time of the Village's decision to deny the
variance, there were at least nine undeveloped tracts of land in excess of fifteen
acres zoned R-5. . . .The record does not contain a sufficient showing by plaintiffs
that it was not reasonably possible to construct the proposed project on one of these
sites. Id. at 416.
47. Id. at 414.
48. 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974).
49. Id. at 334.
50. 517 F.2d at 414.
51. Id.
52. 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974).
53. Id. at 810.
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distressing in the area of federally assisted housing, due to the national policy to balance and disperse public housing. Local authorities are under an obligation to further these goals, certainly to the
extent of refraining from frustrating efforts to carry out the policy."
Delray's past actions were found to be inconsistent with this policy
and added force to the claim against the city. 5
A court need not stop at examining the "ultimate effect;" it can,
and should, also examine the "historical context." This investigation is not limited to the past actions of the particular local government, it can extend to the entire metropolitan area. The Blackjack
court found that the discriminatory effect of the ordinance was more
onerous when viewed in light of housing segregation in the entire St.
Louis metropolitan area. The action by the City of Blackjack was
found to be "one more factor contributing to the confinement of
blacks in the center city.""6
The analysis by which the Arlington Heights court found a discriminatory effect appears to be most practical under the circumstances. If the area surrounding Arlington Heights were in fact successfully integrated, the Village's denial of a zoning variance would
have had little impact on the availability of housing to racial minorities. The effect of the denial is therefore heightened by the fact that
the forty percent of the prospective tenants who are black have little
hope of finding affordable housing outside of segregated black
areas."
54. Crow v. Brown, 332 F.Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), a/I'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
See also Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 821 (3rd Cir. 1970); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority, 296 F.Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill.
1969); Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F.Supp. 619 (E.D. La.
1969); Blackshear Residents Organization v. Housing Authority of City of Austin, 347 F.
Supp. 1138 (W.D. Tex. 1972); Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, 355
F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
55. 493 F.2d at 811.
56. 508 F.2d at 1186. Many state courts have held that municipalities are not isolated and,
consequently, that land use decisions by one local entity can affect the entire region. See
Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972); National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215
A.2d 597 (1965); Note, Phased Zoning: Regulation of the Tempo and Sequence of Land
Development, 26 STAN. L. REv. 585 (1974); Walsh, Are Local Zoning Bodies Required by the
Constitution to ConsiderRegional Needs?, 3 CONN. L. REv.244 (1971). Contra, Construction
Industry Association of Sonoma County, et. al. v. The City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (1975),
in which the court stated:
If the present system of delegated zoning power does not effectively serve the state
interest in furthering the general welfare of the region or entire state, it is the state
legislature's and not the federal courts' role to intervene and adjust the system.
See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), in which the Court struck down a massive interdistrict remedy for segregated schools in Detroit, Michigan. The Court did find that if a
constitutional violation in one school district had a segregative effect in another district,
boundaries would be set aside for remedial purposes.
57. The problem is magnified by the inability of blacks to take full opportunity of the
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Although the Arlington Heights decision does state that the Village has an affirmative duty,58 the court does not impose such a
duty. It merely orders the Village not to interfere with the actions
of an outsider, M.H.D.C., in attempting to alleviate the problem. 9
THE BLACKJACK RATIONALE

The Arlington Heights court found a violation of the fourteenth
amendment, whereas the Eighth Circuit in Blackjack"° used different reasoning to achieve the same result. That court used the socalled "prima facie case" concept to find a violation of a federal
statute. Once defendant's actions can predictively be shown to result in discrimination, to overcome such an inference defendant
must demonstrate that a compelling governmental interest is furthered by its actions. The court made it clear that it was not basing
its decision on the fourteenth amendment, but instead was extending the compelling governmental interest requirement to the viola2
tion of a federal statute,6' the Fair Housing Act.
In a more restrictive manner the Supreme Court adopted the
"prima facie case" approach. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green63
dealt with alleged employment discrimination in violation of Title
VII.64 The Court found that plaintiff had the burden of establishing
a prima facie case, and presented a typical procedure by which
plaintiff could satisfy that requirement. Resulting segregation in the
corporation would not have been sufficient for the McDonnell
Court.6 5 If such a prima facie case were established, the burden
growing job market in the area. In 1970 only 137 of the 13,000 people who worked in Arlington
Heights were black. A study issued by the Cook County Office of Economic Opportunity, A
STUDY OF INDUSTRY IN ARLINGTON HmGHTS, found the main problem faced by area employers
in hiring minorities was the lack of adequate housing within a reasonable distance of their
plants and offices. 517 F.2d at 414 n.2.
58. A highly significant state court opinion, Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v.
Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), found a community does have
an affirmative duty:
Mount Laurel must, by its land use regulations, make realistically possible the
opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of housing for all categories of
people who may desire to live there, of course including those of low and moderate
income.
Id. at 731-32.
59. 517 F.2d at 414.
60. United States v. City of Blackjack, Missouri, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
61. Id. at 1185 n.4.
62. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970) [hereinafter cited
in text as Fair Housing Act].
63. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
64. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
65. Plaintiff could show: (1) he was a member of racial minority; (2) he applied and was
qualified for a job opening; (3) he was rejected; and (4) the job then remained open and the
employer continued seeking applicants of equal qualifications as plaintiff. 411 U.S. at 802.
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would shift to defendants to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminating reason for its action." Compelling justification would not be
required in such a case, but it must be noted that the defendant in
an employment discrimination case is typically a private corporation, whereas the defendant in a discriminatory zoning action is a
governmental entity. It may be that no justification presented by a
private entity could be considered compelling. 7
Contrasts between the prima facie case requirements of
McDonnell and the prima facie approach of Blackjack are striking.
Allowing a mere discriminatory effect to be used as an inference of
racial discrimination and then placing a heavy burden on defendant
to justify its actions may not have been contemplated by the Court
in McDonnell, at least in dealing with Title VII.
To achieve the objectives of the Fair Housing Act, it may indeed
be proper for a court to require compelling reasons for actions having
a discriminatory effect. The Act states that "[iut is the policy of
the United States to provide within constitutional limitations, for
fair housing throughout the United States."6 In language "as broad
as Congress could have made it,""s the Act makes it unlawful to take

an action that makes a dwelling unavailable to a person because of
race, color, religion or national origin.7 0 It has been established that,
under the thirteenth amendment, the Fair Housing Act is an appropriate and constitutionally permissable exercise of congressional
power to eliminate all badges and incidents of slavery. 7
It appears from the reach, thus given the Fair Housing Act that
the rights of racial minorities to housing may be akin to a fundamental right requiring compelling justification.7 2 The reasoning
adopted by the Blackjack court therefore has a constitutional basis
66. Id.
67. The rationale of the "prima facie case" approach adopted by the Eighth Circuit is
concerned with such a distinction. The case of Williams v. Mathews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th
Cir. 1974), dealt with racially discriminatory policies by a private real estate developer. That
court examined the policies and procedures of defendant merely to find legitimate reasons
for its actions.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970).
69. Zuch v. Hussey, 366 F.Supp. 553, 557 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970). The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.D.C. § 1982 (1970), bars
all racial discrimination, private and public, in housing. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968).
71. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934
(1972); United States v. Real Estate Development Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Miss. 1972);
United States v. Mintzes, 304 F.Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969).
72. The compelling governmental interest requirement is most often expressed in equal
protection challenges to statutes in either of two ways: impinging on fundamental rights,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); or in
creating suspect classification, In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Koremetsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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in the thirteenth amendment, although the court could cite no precedent for its application of the compelling
governmental interest
3
7
standard to a similar fact situation.

THE ARLINGTON REASONING

M.H.D.C. briefed an argument based on the Blackjack reasoning. 7' However, the Arlington Heights court declined to follow this
precedent. There are a number of possible reasons for the court
ignoring this approach.
The language of the Fair Housing Act may require that, to find a
violation, a more positive discriminatory act must occur than the
court could discern in the actions of the Village Board. The Board
merely failed to change the status quo, which contrasts with the
positive actions taken by the City of Blackjack after learning of the
plans for the housing development. Furthermore, in Sisters of Providence of St. Mary of the Woods v. City of Evanston,75 the court
stated:
The denial of a zoning petition, though in a sense a negative process, when resulting in racial discrimination and part of a pattern
that has perpetuated racial stratification is no less assertive conduct of a discriminatory nature than the more positive7 procedure
of.

.

. zoning out low and moderate income housing. 1

Although Sisters of Providence was an equal protection case, its
reasoning should apply with equal force to decisions based on federal statutes. The Griggs holding made it clear that positive acts are
not necessary to find a discriminatory effect. Since there are situations where there is not even the opportunity to request a change,
the existence of a status quo situation having a discriminatory effect
can be sufficient to constitute a prima facie violation of a statute.77
Another reason the Arlington Heights court may have had in
using the fourteenth amendment is that there is precedent in the
area of equal protection for requiring compelling justification, and
that was the standard the court wanted applied to Arlington
Heights. The same court, one year earlier, used the prima facie
approach to find a violation of the thirteenth amendment in a hous73. 508 F.2d at 1185.
74. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 32, Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. The
Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975).
75. 335 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
76. Id. at 403.
77. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, (1971). The Court based its opinion on the
consequences of the use of employment practices, not the initiation of the practices. Id. at
432.
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ing case." The finding in Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc.,"° was
that a dual housing market existed in Chicago and this caused
inflated market prices. This was sufficient to establish a prima facie
case of racial discrimination. After giving the builder an opportunity to present legitimate reasons for his pricing policies, the court
required the builder to forego those inflated prices. 0 The Seventh
Circuit, in speaking of violations of the Fair Housing Act by private
entities, may feel it appropriate to apply the legitimate objective
test rather than the more difficult to meet compelling justification
test. When a governmental entity is involved, the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment is fulfilled, and it is more
appropriate to speak of such a violation in terms of equal protection
and compelling justification.
The Arlington Heights court held that, absent compelling justification for the Village's decision, the refusal to grant the requested
zoning change is a violation of the equal protection clause. In support of its holding, the court cited United Farmworkers of Florida
Housing Project,Inc. v. City of Delray, Florida."'The City of Delray
Beach refused to permit a proposed housing project to tie into the
City's existing water and sewer systems. Although the area was
outside the city limits, the City was guided by its "Master Land Use
Plan" in deciding whether to annex the land and whether to provide
water and sewer services. The court found that many deviations
from the annexation policies and significant exceptions to the Master Plan were granted to accomodate white citizens' requests. 82 Such
conduct appears to be a classic case of government acting in an
arbitrary manner," however the court did not base its decision on
such grounds. The court instead used the same reasoning later
adopted in Arlington Heights. The effect of the City's refusal was
racially discriminatory and the City had a "heavy burden of demonstrating that its refusal, and resulting discrimination were necessary
to promote a compelling governmental interest." 84
This case is distinguishable from Arlington Heights in that, in
Delray, even though zoning policies are discussed, the court is primarily concerned with the granting of city services. Decisions by
municipalities regarding the granting of services have in the past
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Circuit Judge Swygert wrote the opinions in both the Arlington and Clark cases.
501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 339.
493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 809.
The classic example is Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
493 F.2d at 809.
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received closer judicial scrutiny than zoning decisions. 5 Zoning restrictions limiting growth or discriminating against the poor must
only be rationally related to some aspect of the police power. 8 This
broad power given to local governments in zoning was reiterated in
7 where even the
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,1
preservation of
88
community values was found to be a valid zoning objective.
The Arlington Heights zoning decision was found to be racially
discriminatory and race is a suspect classification." Distinctions
based on a suspect classification are subject to strict scrutiny by
courts.9 The strict scrutiny standard requires that the objective
sought to be advanced by the classification must rise to the level of
a compelling governmental interest.9 Compelling justification must
therefore be necessary to uphold a zoning distinction based on race
or to one that has an effect of racial discrimination.
85. In Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, N.Y., 436 F.2d 108 (2nd Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971), a case with similar fact pattern, the original action
was brought against zoning ordinances. The City quickly rescinded those ordinances, but the
Mayor then simply refused to grant the sewer permits necessary to construct the subdivision.
Although zoning was discussed, the refusal to grant city services was the basis for the court
finding the City's actions unconstitutional.
86. The landmark decision of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), held that
if the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes is fairly debatable, the
legislative judgment must be allowed to control. Illinois law is in accord. For example, Morgan v. City of Chicago, 370 Ill. 347, 18 N.E.2d 872 (1938), held that courts will not substitute
their judgment when it is fairly debatable whether a zoning ordinance is an unreasonable
exercise of the police power. For a thorough discussion of the role of the courts in zoning, see
Schnidman, The Courts Enter the Zoning Game, Will Local Government Win or Lose? 43
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 590 (1975).
In discussing services the court, in United Farmworkers of Florida Housing Project v. The
City of Delray Beach, Florida. 493 F.2d 799, 808 (1974), stated: "While a city may have no
obligation . . . to provide services . . . once it begins to do so, it must do so in a racially
nondiscriminatory manner." Also see Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (libraries); and
City of St. Petersburg v. Alsup, 238 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1956) (beach and swimming pool).
87. Housing in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1971), and wealth in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), were found not to be suspect
classifications. Therefore zoning restrictions discriminating against the poor must only be
rationally related to some aspect of the police power. The use of exclusionary zoning to
exclude the poor has been the subject of numerous articles. See, e.g., Rubinowicz, Exclusionary Zoning: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 6 U. MICH. L.J. 625 (1973), and Use of Zoning
Laws to Prevent Poor People from Moving into Suburbia, 16 How. L.J. 351 (1971).
88. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). Another recent example of the zoning power is Construction
Industry Ass'n of Sonoma v. The City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), where the
court allowed local zoning authorities to restrict growth.
89. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
90. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
91. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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COMPELLING JUSTIFICATION

A requirement of compelling justification will seldom be satisfied.92 The justification advanced in Delray was the necessity for the
City to remain faithful to its annexation policies and Master Plan.
This was found hardly credible because the City made many exceptions to the plan in the brief time period the plan was in effect.9 3
The Delray court did recognize the importance of master plans in
land use planning, 4 suggesting that if the plan has been adhered to
for a longer period of time, the court might have ruled differently.
The Arlington Heights master plan, the court found, had been
followed fairly consistently since its adoption in 1959. The Arlington
Heights court did not find the integrity of the plan compelling because there had been some deviations from it. Further, the rationale
behind the buffer policy would not be violated in spirit by the type
of dwellings planned for Lincoln Green.
Due to the growing importance of comprehensive plans for land
use and the necessity for these plans to remain pragmatic, 9 city
planners should not strive for one hundred percent adherence solely
to prepare a compelling justification defense. Whether even one
hundred percent faithfulness would satisfy a court is problematical.
The other justification offered by Arlington Heights was that
property values in the surrounding area might diminish as much as
five to ten percent due to the construction of Lincoln Green. The
reason advanced by the Village for this diminution, was that residents could no longer rely on the integrity of the Comprehensive
Plan. The court not only rejected this justification, 7 it might have
inferred that the real reason for the feared diminution was racial.
The same court, in Clark, found that a segregated housing market
92. In determining whether the justification rises to the level of a compelling interest,
essentially a three part test is used: (1) does the law or ordinance further the governmental
interest asserted; (2) is that interest constitutionally permissible and substantial enough to
outweigh the public detriment it caused; and (3) are less drastic means available. See Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
93. United Farmworkers of Florida Housing Project v. The City of Delray Beach, Florida,
493 F.2d 799, 809 (5th Cir. 1974).
94. Id.at 813.
95. 517 F.2d at 415. See note 6 supra.
96. For a thorough discussion of comprehensive plans and the consistency requirement
see Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REv. 1154, 1167 (1955).
State courts have held that there is no legal requirement that zoning correspond with a master
plan, Donahue v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Whitemarsh Township, 412 Pa. 332, 194
A.2d 610 (1963).
97. 517 F.2d at 415.
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kept property values artificially high. 8 Thus, it is understandable
why the court found Arlington Heights was "exploiting the problem
by allowing itself to become an almost one hundred percent white
community.""
The defendant in Blackjack also offered the prevention of devaluation of property values as a justification, as well as inadequate
roads, traffic control and the prevention of overcrowded schools.
That court was not satisfied that the achievement of any of these
goals was advanced by the City's zoning ordinance.10O
The justification offered in Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of
Lackawanna, N. Y,"" that the city sewer system was inadequate,
was also held insufficient. The court found that the system had been
grossly deficient for years, and that the City was responsible for
allowing the deterioration. The City was then ordered to provide
adequate sewerage facilities for the proposed development. °2 If a
city could demonstrate that a new project would strain a variety of
city services, e.g., schools, roads, sewage, etc., and it did not have
the present resources to solve the resulting problems without a
major deterioration in its services, compelling justification might be
found. But even in this situation the court might, as in Kennedy,
order the city to grant its new residents the same services it had
been granting its citizens.
An option that should be left open to a city is to give legitimate
reasons why the site is unsuitable for the project. Justifications such
as conflict with the Comprehensive Plan, insufficiency of city sewers
and traffic problems should suffice. Conflicts with the ecology and
aesthetic considerations could also be weighed. If the city can then
demonstrate that there is available to plaintiff alternate property
similar in price and location and that a project built on the alternate
site would have the same effect on the segregation problem, then
that should constitute sufficient justification. 3 However, to courts
98. Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 334 (7th Cir. 1974).
99. 517 F.2d at 414.
100. 508 F.2d at 1188.
101. 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
102. 436 F.2d at 413.
103. Even more convincing would be the adoption of a comprehensive plan providing for
that community's share of the region's housing needs. In such a situation,
[t]o permit a developer to come in at a later date and demand, as a matter of right,
that a piece of property not presently zoned to permit development of low or moderate cost housing be so zoned, is to undermine the entire premise of land use
regulation.
Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d
713 (1975) (concurring opinion).
See also Conferacion de Ia Raza Unida v. City of Morgan Hill, 324 F.Supp. 895 (N.D. Cal.
1971).
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strictly applying the traditional compelling justification standard
used in the area of the fourteenth amendment, it would not be
sufficient. If the decision rested on the Fair Housing Act and the
thirteenth amendment, perhaps a court could be more pragmatic in
its determination of justification.
CONCLUSION

The steadily expanding limits of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment have now infringed on the formerly solid
police power of local governments to determine land use. Such a
development may be necessary to solve the serious problem of segregated housing existing in many metropolitan areas. For example,
the court in Blackjack characterized the City's decision not to rezone as contributing to the process by which the St. Louis metropolitan area assumes the shape of a doughnut, with the Negroes in the
hole and with mostly whites occupying the ring.0 4 It has been stated
that the goal of our national housing policy is to replace these ghettoes with truly integrated and balanced living patterns for persons
of all races. 05
The immediate result of cases such as Arlington Heights would
be to encourage builders to seek zoning variances in suburbs with a
small racial minority population. As long as the builder can present
evidence that a large percentage of the prospective residents consist
of racial minorities and that the municipality has done, and will
continue to do, nothing to encourage integration or discourage segregation, that municipality would be ill advised to refuse to rezone.
A municipality should be especially cooperative with a non-profit
builder, such as M.H.D.C., utilizing funds from federal programs.
Courts will tend to look more favorably upon granting judicial relief
to aid developments planned by such builders than developments
planned by private builders. A private builder must be considered
primarily interested in profit and any resulting integration would
be, at best, secondarily important. The actions of many non-profit
builders are planned to have the ultimate effect of integration. This
effect is necessary before a municipality's actions in halting a development can be found racially discriminatory. Also, these federal
programs evidence the congressional policy to encourage low income
integrated housing and this serves as a strong justification for finding violations of the Fair Housing Act.
The Arlington Heights decision may find constitutional justifica104.
105.

508 F.2d at 1186.
Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, Indiana, 491 F.2d 161, 164 (7th Cir. 1974).
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tion in the area of equal protection, but such a basis may have more
far-reaching significance than the court had foreseen.' 6 Although
this decision purports to be limited to its facts, the essence of its
rationale can be applied to areas other than housing. A firmer and
tighter constitutional basis for such zoning decisions exists in the
Fair Housing Act. The goals of this Act enunciate a national housing
policy, which gives greater justification for Using the effects analysis
in zoning cases.
Furthermore, the compelling standard of the fourteenth amendment can be exchanged for more pragmatic considerations. If a less
demanding standard was applied to the justification advanced by
Arlington Heights, it would be a closer question of fact as to whether
the availability of alternate sites, zoned in accordance with the
Comprehensive Plan, would be sufficient justification.
Ascertaining effects through statistics is certainly preferable to
guessing motives, but the effect must be very direct, probable and
undesirable. Courts have used effects in such fields as voting, education, employment and housing. Manifestly, these are fields where
there is a strong national policy and commitment to stop discrimination. The difficulty of overcoming the burden of justification once
a discriminatory effect is found should make courts wary about
extending this reasoning outside these areas.
It should also be clear that finding a discriminatory "ultimate
effect" is not enough; there must be a "historical context" of racial
discrimination. A zoning ordinance having a discriminatory effect
will have a much more serious impact in a segregated community
that has completely abdicated its responsibilities in relieving the
segregation problem than in a community that in the past has provided racial minorities with reasonable access to affordable housing.
THOMAS W.

CODY

106. The recent case of Warth v. Seldin, 95 S.Ct. 2197 (1975), indicates that in order to
challenge the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance, plaintiff must first satisfy stringent
standing requirements. The Court found that to challenge exclusionary zoning practices
plaintiff must demonstrate a particularized personal interest. A present contractual basis in
a housing project would satisfy that requirement.

